Details
Category
Author
Role
Author / Writer
Industry
Arts & Literature
Wikidata
Q2347681
Birth Date
1946-05-29
Gender
male
Nationality
United States
Birthplace
Washington, D.C.
Occupations
economist
Education
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Personal Name
Steven Shavell
Awards
Fellow of the Econometric Society, Guggenheim Fellowship
Languages
English
Relationships
Written By (Incoming)
Threats without binding commitmentOn the superiority of corrective taxes to quantity regulationShould copyright of academic works be abolished?Notions of fairness versus the Pareto principleAll individuals may be made worse off under any nonwelfarist principleOn the design of the appeals processOptimal sanctions and the incentive to provide evidence to legal tribunalsSharing of information prior to settlement or litigationOptimal discretion in the application of rulesIndividual precautions to prevent theftEconomic analysis of property lawEconomic Analysis of LawThe level of litigationFairness versus WelfareMinimum asset requirements and compulsory liability insurance as solutions to the judgment-proof problemMinimum asset requirements and compulsory liability insurance as solutions to the judgment-proof problemFairness versus welfareLegal adviceThe corrective tax versus liability as solutions to the problem of harmful externalitiesOn the writing and the interpretation of contractsIndividual precautions to prevent theftEconomic Analysis of Accident LawEconomic analysis of the general structure of the lawEconomic analysis of lawAn economic analysis of tort lawContractsSharing of information prior to settlement or litigationA note on the incentive to reveal informationThe fundamental divergence between the private and the social motive to use the legal systemEconomic analysis of accident lawOn the design of contracts and remedies for breachLiability and the incentive to obtain information about riskThe judgment proof problemSuit versus settlement when parties seek nonmonetary judgmentsOn the disutility and discounting of imprisonment and the theory of deterrenceDo excessive legal standards discourage desirable activity?Minimum asset requirements and compulsory liability insurance as solutions to the judgment-proof problemWelfare economics, morality, and the lawLegal error, litigation, and the incentive to obey the lawSpecific performance versus damages for breach of contractEconomic analysis of public law enforcement and criminal lawAn analysis of accident lawThe advantage of focusing law enforcement effortOn optimal legal change, past behavior, and grandfatheringEconomic analysis of welfare economics, morality and the lawMicroeconomicsWhen is it socially desirable for an individual to comply with the lawOn the social function and the regulation of liability insuranceThe optimal use of nonmonetary sanctions as a deterrentA note on optimal deterrence when individuals choose among harmful actsEconomic analysis of litigation and the legal processThe appeals process as a means of error correctionThe appeals process and adjudicator incentivesSpecific versus general enforcement of lawCorrective taxation versus liabilityLegal advice about contemplated actsOn valuable opinion and the efficiency of the price system under uncertainty.Eminent domain versus government purchase of land given imperpect information about owners' valuationEconomic analysis of accident lawAcquisition and disclosure of information prior to economic exchangeA note on optimal deterrence when individuals choose among harmful actsContracts, holdup, and legal interventionOn the writing and the interpretation of contractsOptimal sanctions and the incentive to provide evidence to legal tribunalsAny non-welfarist method of policy assessment violates the Pareto principle法と経済学A liberal theory of social welfareEconomic analysis of lawMoral rules and the moral sentimentsAny frequency of plaintiff victory at trial is possibleA note on the optimal use of imprisonment to incapacitateLiability for harm versus regulation of safetyEconomic analysis of contract lawAny non-individualistic social welfare function violates the Pareto principleContractingEconomic analysis of accident lawThe economic theory of public enforcement of lawAlternative dispute resolutionEconomic analysis of accident lawDecision Analysis, Game Theory, and InformationLaw versus morality as regulators of conductContingent valuation of the nonuse value of natural resourcesEconomics and liability for accidentsFoundations of Economic Analysis of LawA note on the incentive to reveal information
